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Recent Developments
Pollitt v. State

U

nder Maryland Rule 4312(b)(3), trial judges
have complete discretion to select
alternate jurors for non-capital
trials. When alternates have not
been chosen, the Rules provide
various remedies for replacing a
juror who becomes, or is discovered to be, disabled and must
be removed from jury service. In
Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686
A.2d 629 (1996), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that if a
jury is impanelled without alternates and a sworn juror is excused
prior to the start of trial, a substitute juror may only be sua
sponte appointed from the remaining venire with the express consent
of both parties.
Following his arrest for assault
and battery, Frederick Pollitt
("Pollitt") elected a jury trial in the
Circuit Court for Wicomico
County. Expecting a short trial,
neither the court nor the parties
requested alternate jurors. After
exhausting their peremptory challenges, both parties consented to
the first twelve people in the remaining venire and the jury was
sworn. Before opening statements
had begun, however, the trial judge
noticed that juror number one had
difficulty hearing.
With the
parties' consent, thejudge excused
the juror from duty.
Pollitt believed that when the
trial judge then asked if either
party objected to selecting another
juror, the judge would allow the
parties to exercise additional peremptory challenges with respect to
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the replacement juror. Since the
potential jurors who were approved on voir dire but not
selected remained in the court
room, the judge decided, for the
sake of convenience, to simply
impanel the next person on the
jury list as juror number one.
After the judge ordered the
replacement juror sworn, Pollitt
immediately requested a bench
conference where he moved to
strike the new juror. The judge
denied the motion on the grounds
that Pollitt had exercised all of his
strikes and additional strikes were
only permitted for selecting
alternate jurors, and the new juror
was not an alternate. The trial
progressed and the defendant was
convicted.
In the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland, Pollitt presented two
arguments. First, by refusing to
allow additional strikes the trial
judge denied him his right to make
an informed and comparative
rej ection of a potential juror.
Second, by impanelling a substitute juror, the judge effectively

chose an alternate juror without
permitting additional challenges as
required by Maryland Rule 4313(a)(5). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the circuit court
conviction. Pollitt petitioned the
Court of Appeals of Maryland for
a writ of certiorari to review the
issues before the court of special
appeals.
In the court of appeals, Pollitt
again argued that by denying
additional peremptory challenges
the trial judge violated his right to
make informed and comparative
rejections of jurors as set forth in
Spencer v. State. Pollitt, 344 Md.
at 322, 686 A.2d at 631 (citing
Spencer v. State, 20 Md. App. 201,
314 A.2d 727 (1974)). In Spencer,
after counsel executed their strikes,
the court clerk arbitrarily altered
the order in which jurors were
selected. Pollitt at 322, 686 A.2d
at 631. Doing so thwarted defense
counsel's strategy for having
desirable jurors impanelled on the
jury. Id. at 322, 686 A.2d at 631.
After acknowledging that the jury
selection process afforded the
parties the right to attempt to both
choose and reject potential jurors
in order to obtain a favorable jury,
the Spencer court then held that
the clerk's act '''affirmatively misled '" defense counsel and denied
the defendant that right. Id. at
322-23,686 A.2d at 631 (quoting
Spencer, 20 Md. App. at 208, 314
A.2d at 732).
In the case at bar, Pollitt contended that his right to comparative rejection was violated in
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 79
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like manner. Id at 322-23, 686
A.2d at 631. Pollitt argued that, as
in Spencer, his strikes were based
upon his understanding of which
jurors from the jury list were likely
to become eligible for selection.
Pollitt at 323, 686 A.2d at 631.
The court of appeals, however,
distinguished Spencer from the
present case. Pollitt at 323, 686
A.2d at 631. The court held that,
unlike Spencer, no affirmative
denial occurred here because no
one could have predicted the disability of the initial juror. Pollitt at
323, 686 A.2d at 631.
Pollitt also argued that by
simply choosing the next juror
from the remaining venire, the trial
judge effectively selected an alternate juror without allowing the
parties to exercise additional
peremptory challenges as required
by rule. Id. at 324, 686 A.2d at
631-32. While the court of appeals
did not expressly hold that the trial
judge had selected an alternate
juror, it nevertheless found the
judge's novel approach logical and
held it to be appropriate if all
parties consent. Id. at 325, 686
A.2d at 632.
The court of appeals also found
that in this circumstance, however,
Pollitt had not consented to the sua
sponte selection. Id at 325-26,
686 A.2d at 632-33. Because
Pollitt believed that he would be
allowed additional peremptory
challenges, his consent to calling
the next juror was conditioned on
his ability to challenge the replacement juror with an additional
strike as if the juror was being
chosen as an alternate. Id at 326,
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 80

686 A.2d at 632-33. Finding that
belief to be entirely reasonable in
light of the circumstances, the
court of appeals ruled that when
the judge refused to allow
additional strikes, petitioner's
conditional
consent
was
extinguished. Id at 326, 686 A.2d
at 633.
Without the parties'
consent to sua sponte selection of
a replacement juror or to proceeding with only eleven jurors,
the court held that the trial judge
"had no choice but to declare a
mistrial." Id at 326, 686 A.2d at
633.
After a trial commences,
dismissal of jurors for various
valid reasons is not uncommon.
Prior to Pollitt, when jurors were
dismissed in criminal cases, courts
could proceed in one of three
ways: (1) if an alternate juror was
chosen, instate the alternate juror
as a voting juror as provided in
Maryland Rule 4-312(b); (2) conclude the trial with only eleven
jurors, with consent of the parties
as provided in Maryland Rule 4311 (b); or (3) declare a mistrial as
provided in Article 27, section
594, of the Maryland Annotated
Code. Pollitt, 344 Md. at 324-25,
686 A.2d at 632. In Pollitt, the
trial judge added, and the court of
appeals affirmed, a fourth option
of sua sponte selection from the
remaining venire.
This opinion will force
attorneys to make another important strategic decision on perhaps
only a moment's notice. When a
jury is impanelled without alternates and a sworn juror is then
dismissed, attorneys must now

choose from among the following
options: (1) force a mistrial by
withholding consent both to the
sua sponte selection and to proceeding with only eleven jurors;
(2) proceed with only eleven
jurors; or (3) give express consent
to the sua sponte selection. Unfortunately, with respect to the last
option, Pollitt leaves an important
procedural question unanswered:
if the parties consent to replacing
the dismissed juror, do they each
then have the right to strike the
person called? If so, then how
many more strikes are available to
the parties thereafter? If not, then
practically speaking, this holding
creates one additional de facto
strike of the eleven members of the
jury who were successfully sworn.

